The Manifold of Sense - Part II - Technology Article

Partners

Hotel Reservations

By:Sam Vaknin

To say that emotions are cognitions is to say nothing. We understand cognition even less than we understand emotions (with the exception of the mechanics of cognition). To say that emotions are caused by cognitions or cause cognitions (emotivism) or are part of a motivational process – does not answer the question: "What are emotions?". Emotions do cause us to apprehend and perceive things in a certain way and even to act accordingly. But WHAT are emotions? Granted, there are strong, perhaps necessary, connections between emotions and knowledge and, in this respect, emotions are ways of perceiving the world and interacting with it. Perhaps emotions are even rational strategies of adaptation and survival and not stochastic, isolated inter-psychic events. Perhaps Plato was wrong in saying that emotions conflict with reason and thus obscure the right way of apprehending reality. Perhaps he is right: fears do become phobias, emotions do depend on one's experience and character. As we have it in psychoanalysis, emotions may be reactions to the unconscious rather than to the world. Yet, again, Sartre may be right in saying that emotions are a "modus vivendi", the way we "live" the world, our perceptions coupled with our bodily reactions. He wrote: "(we live the world) as though the relations between things were governed not by deterministic processes but by magic". Even a rationally grounded emotion (fear which generates flight from a source of danger) is really a magical transformation (the ersatz elimination of that source). Emotions sometimes mislead. People may perceive the same, analyze the same, evaluate the situation the same, respond along the same vein – and yet have different emotional reactions. It does not seem necessary (even if it were sufficient) to postulate the existence of "preferred" cognitions – those that enjoy an "overcoat" of emotions. Either all cognitions generate emotions, or none does. But, again, WHAT are emotions?
We all possess some kind of sense awareness, a perception of objects and states of things by sensual means. Even a dumb, deaf and blind person still possesses proprioception (perceiving the position and motion of one's limbs). Sense awareness does not include introspection because the subject of introspection is supposed to be mental, unreal, states. Still, if mental states are a misnomer and really we are dealing with internal, physiological, states, then introspection should form an important part of sense awareness. Specialized organs mediate the impact of external objects upon our senses and distinctive types of experience arise as a result of this mediation.
Perception is thought to be comprised of the sensory phase – its subjective aspect – and of the conceptual phase. Clearly sensations come before thoughts or beliefs are formed. Suffice it to observe children and animals to be convinced that a sentient being does not necessarily have to have beliefs. One can employ the sense modalities or even have sensory-like phenomena (hunger, thirst, pain, sexual arousal) and, in parallel, engage in introspection because all these have an introspective dimension. It is inevitable: sensations are about how objects feel like, sound, smell and seen to us. The sensations "belong", in one sense, to the objects with which they are identified. But in a deeper, more fundamental sense, they have intrinsic, introspective qualities. This is how we are able to tell them apart. The difference between sensations and propositional attitudes is thus made very clear. Thoughts, beliefs, judgements and knowledge differ only with respect to their content (the proposition believed/judged/known, etc.) and not in their intrinsic quality or feel. Sensations are exactly the opposite: differently felt sensations may relate to the same content. Thoughts can also be classified in terms of intentionality (they are "about" something) – sensations only in terms of their intrinsic character. They are, therefore, distinct from discursive events (such as reasoning, knowing, thinking, or remembering) and do not depend upon the subject's intellectual endowments (like his power to conceptualize). In this sense, they are mentally "primitive" and probably take place at a level of the psyche where reason and thought have no recourse.
The epistemological status of sensations is much less clear. When we see an object, are we aware of a "visual sensation" in addition to being aware of the object? Perhaps we are only aware of the sensation, wherefrom we infer the existence of an object, or otherwise construct it mentally, indirectly? This is what, the Representative Theory tries to persuade us, the brain does upon encountering the visual stimuli emanating from a real, external object. The Naive Realists say that one is only aware of the external object and that it is the sensation that we infer. This is a less tenable theory because it fails to explain how do we directly know the character of the pertinent sensation.
What is indisputable is that sensation is either an experience or a faculty of having experiences. In the first case, we have to introduce the idea of sense data (the objects of the experience) as distinct from the sensation (the experience itself). But isn't this separation artificial at best? Can sense data exist without sensation? Is "sensation" a mere structure of the language, an internal accusative? Is "to have a sensation" equivalent to "to strike a blow" (as some dictionaries of philosophy have it)? Moreover, sensations must be had by subjects. Are sensations objects? Are they properties of the subjects that have them? Must they intrude upon the subject's consciousness in order to exist – or can they exist in the "psychic background" (for instance, when the subject is distracted)? Are they mere representations of real events (is pain a representation of injury)? Are they located? We know of sensations when no external object can be correlated with them or when we deal with the obscure, the diffuse, or the general. Some sensations relate to specific instances – others to kinds of experiences. So, in theory, the same sensation can be experienced by several people. It would be the same KIND of experience – though, of course, different instances of it. Finally, there are the "oddball" sensations, which are neither entirely bodily – nor entirely mental. The sensations of being watched or followed are two examples of sensations with both components clearly intertwined.
(continued)

Digg del.icio.us Blink Stumble Spurl Reddit Netscape Furl

Article Source: http://www.articles2k.com

Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for Central Europe Review, United Press International (UPI) and eBookWeb and the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory, Suite101 and searcheurope.com.

Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com